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ABSTRACT 
 
Three crucial ingredients influence how much individuals will have to fund retirement 
income needs: how much they contribute to savings, how long they save for, and the 
performance of these savings. This paper focuses on the issue of performance, and how 
individuals perform when they are given the choice of making their own investment strategy 
for their retirement savings contributions. An empirical examination using a large sample 
gathered from four Australian superannuation funds is utilised and finds that on average 
members underperform their own fund’s default option both in raw returns and on a risk-
adjusted basis. For trustees and regulators charged with the responsibility of looking after the 
interests of members an important result identifies significant differences in performance 
based on how members are allowed to construct their investment strategy. 

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 
1. Introduction 
 
Australia, like many countries over the past two decades, has implemented a range of 
policies to address an ageing population and the expected fiscal challenge this 
demographic change presents for future governments. One such challenge is the 
government’s ability to provide an age pension as currently entitled, or, at current 
entitlement levels.1 A major policy component of successive Australian governments, 
reflected in many developed countries, has been to shift the expectation of responsibility 
for income provision in retirement from the government to the individual.  
 
Central to the retirement incomes policy in Australia was the introduction in 1992 of the 
Superannuation Guarantee Act, which requires employers to make contributions on 
behalf of their employees to a complying superannuation fund.2 The contribution rate 
was set initially at three percent of earnings but since 2002 has been nine percent. 
Paralleling this trend over the past 15 years, which can be characterised as the modern 
era of Australian superannuation, has been the movement from defined benefit (DB) to 
defined contribution (DC) funds and products. Contributions are increasingly directed to 
defined contribution (DC) funds where the majority of members have a choice in the 
investment strategy for those contributions. The average number of options available for 
these investment strategies across all fund types is 38 (Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority, 2008), greater than the range of 11 to 20 options offered by the majority of 
U.S. plans (DiCenzo, 2007, p.10). However, most individuals choose not to exercise 
this choice with 51 percent of assets remaining in the default investment strategy 
                                                 
1
 There is some debate as to whether the demographic shift does present a problem and questioning of the 
appropriateness of the Australian government response. For example Mitchell and Mosler (2003) suggest 
the discussion and debate about the topic has been “misguided at best” (Mitchell and Mosler, 2003, p.3). 
2
 Superannuation funds can be considered equivalent to U.S. 401(K) plans. 
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(Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 2008, Table 15).3 In addition to this 
investment choice, since July 2005, a majority of Australian employees have also had a 
legislated entitlement to choose to which superannuation fund their contributions are 
directed to through the Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice of 
Superannuation Funds) Act 2004, commonly referred to as choice of fund. However, 
once again, few have exercised this choice with only four percent of employees 
changing their superannuation funds, in the first six months since being given the 
opportunity, primarily due to change of employment (Clare, 2006). 
 
This default behaviour is not peculiar to Australia nor is it peculiar to retirement savings 
decisions. In the U.S. Madrian and Shea (2001) and more recently Mitchell, Mottola, 
Utkus and Yamaguchi (2006) identify that most U.S. DC participants do not trade 
(change their investment strategy) at all and remain in the plan default. McKenzie, 
Liersch and Finkelstein (2006) assess explanations for default behaviour through a 
series of experiments and identify previous default behaviour literature in insurance, 
organ donation and internet privacy policies. 
 
Within a DC product member choices directly impact on their accumulated retirement 
savings, hence, for those who do make investment strategy changes, an important 
question is how well do their choices perform. This is the empirical question 
investigated in this paper utilising a large sample of member investment choices to 
examine what sort of choices members make and how well these investment decisions 
perform in raw returns, relative to a selection of benchmarks, and adjusted for risk. 
                                                 
3
 This is not a perfect measure. It is based on the total assets in what is labelled a default strategy by a 
fund. However because a default is not mandatory, where a default is not labelled APRA (2008) takes the 
strategy with the most assets as the default.  
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The appropriateness of a particular investment choice is ultimately determined by 
considering member circumstances including, but not restricted to, the amount of assets 
outside superannuation, the level of debt, number of dependants, and risk tolerance. 
This information is not readily available and hence investigation of the appropriateness 
of particular choices is beyond the scope of the paper.  
 
The examination of individual performance is not just of interest to individuals. Fund 
trustees and government must consider the consequences of member performance in 
terms of their fiduciary duty and potential fiscal obligations respectively. Fund trustees 
are required to formulate an investment strategy by the Superannuation Industry 
(Supervision) Act 1993 with the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 
responsible for more detailed guidelines for trustees. APRA’s guidelines reflect high 
expectations of trustees with regard to members exercising investment strategy choice. 
They provide warnings to trustees about allowing members “narrow or risky” choices 
without regard to what is in the best interests of members (APRA, 2006, p.12). Donald 
(2006) reviews the nature of the trust structure used by superannuation funds in an 
environment of member choice and suggests “trustees of many superannuation funds 
find themselves in a vacuum when it comes to deciding how to offer choice when to do 
so might represent an abdication of a fundamental fiduciary responsibility” (Donald, 
2006, p.12). The question of whether a particular choice is in the best interests of a 
member is arguably both an empirical one and a forecast. The results of this paper will 
provide some empirical evidence about the performance of types of choices that 
members can make. 
 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a review of the theoretical 
literature on making investment strategy changes and subsequent performance within 
the retirement savings context and the broader household savings context. The third 
section describes the sample data and the fourth section examines the methodology 
employed in measuring performance and estimated performance relationship. The fifth 
section presents results and the final section concludes with a discussion of results and 
identifies areas of future research. 
 
2. Why Should Investment Choice be Exercised? Theory and Evidence 
 
Mitchell, et al. (2006) identify that using the traditional finance theoretical framework 
of the Capital Asset Pricing Model would suggest fund members choices and changes 
reflect underlying risk preferences having identified efficient portfolios. Changes to 
portfolio choice would follow given changes to return and risk expectations and so long 
as the expected benefits exceed the costs of trading, in keeping with Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980) (Mitchell, et al., 2006, p.3). Investment finance theory suggests that if 
capital markets are efficient, these changes will not earn fund members abnormal 
returns consistently (Fama 1970, 1991). However a less restrictive definition of 
efficiency suggests those who do trade based on costly information may earn higher 
returns to compensate for the higher trading costs (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). 
 
The reality is however that few members choose to move out of the default investment 
option in DC plans. Bowman (2003) suggests that only ten percent of Australian 
superannuation fund members with investment choice actually exercise it. This is in line 
with the sample in this paper where between ten and fifteen percent of members 
exercise investment choice. U.S. results are similar. Agnew, Balduzzi and Sunden 
 
(2003) find that only seven percent of members of a 401(k) plan have more than one 
investment change with an average of approximately one change every four years and 
overall 87% of members have no investment changes. This evidence is echoed by 
Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) who find approximately 75 percent of TIAA-CREF 
members make no investment changes over a decade. Mitchell, et al. (2006) 
characterise the trading pattern of 1.2 million participants in approximately 1500 funds 
as “profound inertia” (Mitchell, et al., 2006, p.12). 
 
Similar levels of choice have been evident in Australia following legislation, effective 
in 2006, allowing members to choose the superannuation fund (as distinct from 
changing investment strategy within their existing fund) to receive their mandatory 
employer contributions. Fry, Heaney and McKeown (2007) posit Prospect theory as a 
means of explaining member behaviour when faced with choice of fund. Given loss 
aversion they suggest that the expected benefits/costs ratio of change would need to be 
substantial to encourage change. Fry, Heaney and McKeown (2007) also suggest that 
the bias to inertia is magnified as “superannuation profits cannot be realised until 
retirement”. 
 
This suggests that expected fund performance is a key motivator of member choice. 
While member expectations are not generally observed, it has been demonstrated that 
historical returns are related to aggregate fund flows in retirement funds (Cronqvist and 
Thaler, 2004). At an individual choice level Clark-Murphy, Gerrans and Speelman, 
(2007) have identified apparent returns chasing behaviour in member investment 
choices. Survey work on what might prompt a member to change funds (Clare, 2006) 
also highlights the role of past returns. 
 
 
In the U.S., failure to participate in a 401(k) plan, or equivalent, has been argued as “the 
most obvious error an individual can make and is well researched in the literature” 
(Agnew, 2006, p.27). In Australia given mandatory participation, member contribution 
levels, fund fees and investment strategy choice are fundamental influences on 
accumulated savings. While participation may be well researched, the performance of 
member’s chosen investment strategy performance is not. A recent U.S. exception is 
Yamaguchi, Mitchell, Mottola and Utkus (2006) who use alpha-based performance 
measures derived from the CAPM and factor-based models to assess the investment 
performance of more than 1.5 million participants of 1500 U.S. plans. These can be 
referred to as standard performance metrics of the investment management industry and 
literature. Their paper examines investment decisions over existing balances, not future 
contributions which is the focus of this paper, and make four comparisons. The first is 
those who trade in their 401(k) plan (traders) to those who don’t. The second is those 
who when they trade return their balance allocation to the first observed (target) 
allocation made by the member. The third group are those plan members who 
effectively delegate the portfolio rebalancing to a portfolio manager through a choice of 
balanced or lifecycle funds as against the active rebalancers who make this decision 
themself. The fourth compares those who traded and have the highest turnover rate. 
This final group allows testing whether overconfidence leads to poorer performance as 
suggested by previous research on individual traders (Odean, 1999; Barber and Odean, 
2001 in the US and Guiso and Jappelli, 2006 for Italian investors). 
 
Outside retirement savings investment strategy, a range of studies have examined the 
performance of individuals’ or households’ asset allocation decisions. Guiso and 
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Jappelli (2006) use a sample of customers of a major Italian bank to investigate 
performance and the role of information acquisition. They find a negative correlation 
between trading activity, lack of diversification, lack of delegation to a financial 
advisor, information measured as the reported time customers spent collecting 
information in a typical week, and the Sharpe Ratio of their portfolio performance.  
They contend their results do not support a rational investor choice model instead 
supporting a model where investors are overconfident. Calvet, Campbell and Sodini 
(2006) use a database of Swedish households to assess the performance and social 
welfare impacts of under diversification and non-participation in risky asset markets. 
They find Swedish households to be well diversified with only modest losses due to 
under-diversification. However, they also identify that 38 percent of Swedish 
households do not have risky assets in their financial portfolio, with a resulting financial 
loss, and for five percent of the population the financial loss due to under-diversification 
is five percent of financial wealth.  
 
In Australia, with participation and minimum contributions mandated4 the focus of 
research has primarily been on the adequacy of the mandatory minimum contributions 
levels, types of investment strategy or asset allocation decisions, and the impact of fees 
on accumulated savings. While the performance of superannuation funds has attracted 
research interest (Drew and Stanford, 2001 and 2003; Frino, Heaney and Service, 2005) 
as has the impact of fees on accumulated savings (Bateman and Mitchell, 2003), 
individual member choice performance has not. Drew (2006) employed a normalised 
rank return measure (NRRM), developed by Bauer and Dahlquist (2001), as a means of 
highlighting the difficulties for superannuation fund members in successfully timing the 
                                                 
4
 The provisions of the 2006 Pension Protection Act in the US have removed the obstacles for employers 
to offer automatic plan enrolment and default contributions (DiCenzo, J. 2007, p.4) but there remains no 
legislated obligation for contributions of any sort by employers for employees. 
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market. The NRRM ranks switching strategies between available investment options 
given a switching frequency. Drew (2006) simulated results on the basis of monthly 
switching between a range of paired asset classes between 1985 and 2002. The study 
did not, however, assess actual member choices, instead focussing on what would be 
needed for a member to outperform given the limited set of choices and trading allowed. 
Gallery, Gallery and Brown (2006) review the raw return performance of a sample of 
Australian fund default options noting that the wide variation in returns implies 
differing risk characteristics for similarly labelled options. Using member choices from 
a large sample of investment strategy choices from four Australian funds covering a 
range of employment industries, the current paper provides an overdue empirical 
assessment of actual individual choice.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
Sample Demographics and Choice Options 
Four Australian superannuation funds have provided the investment strategy choice 
history, for future contributions, of their members. Each of the funds are not-for-profit 
funds, three of which are classified as “Industry funds” and one a public-sector fund. 
Industry fund members are drawn from a number of employers within a single industry, 
whereas public-sector funds have members from a government agency or a government 
owned business (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 2005, p.3). Collectively 
the four funds have $44 billion in assets and 1.6 million members. 
 
The top panel of Table 1 summarises key sample member demographics and investment 
characteristics used in this paper. The sample gender split varies significantly across 
funds with Fund 1 having 24 percent males and Fund 2 78 percent. The sample gender 
 
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profile reflects that of each fund’s population. The average contributions were highest 
for Fund 4 members, more than twice that of Fund 1 members. Average age is 
comparable between the funds with a three year spread between the youngest (Fund 2) 
and oldest (Fund 3). Fund 3 members have the longest average investment period of 33 
months and Fund 1 the shortest at 22 months. Members make few choices during the 
whole sample period with the overall average of 1.15 choices. Fund 1 and Fund 2 offer 
the greatest range of investment options and the average number of options used by 
their members reflects this.5 Fund 3 members had been members longest (69 months) 
before they made a choice which is in part because Fund 3 was the last of the funds to 
offer choice to members. There is therefore considerable variation in member and 
investment characteristics across the sample. 
<Insert Table 1> 
Each fund offers a different number and type of investment choice to members. These 
have evolved over time and are summarised in Figure 1. Fund 1, Fund 2 and Fund 3 
offer both readymade options, where the asset allocation is nominated by the fund, and 
a do-it-yourself (DIY) option where the member can choose their own mixture of 
readymade options and individual asset classes. Fund 3 members can construct a DIY 
option using only asset classes, not readymade options, whereas Fund 1 and Fund 2 
members can construct a DIY option using both asset classes and readymade options. 
Fund 4 members could only choose one readymade option with no mixing across 
options allowed.6  
<Insert Figure 1> 
                                                 
5
 Fund 4 members were restricted to one option per selection. 
6
 Fund 4 has since introduced the ability for members to mix readymade options, but outside the data 
sample period of this paper. 
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Fees have been levied by the funds on investment changes at various times through the 
sample period and these are detailed in Figure 1. Fund 1 members were allowed to 
make one free change per annum when choice was introduced in 1995 until June 1998 
but were charged a $20 fee when monthly changes were permitted in July 1998. This 
fee was dropped in 2002. Fund 2 members initially could make quarterly changes in 
July 1997 with the first change free and subsequent changes attracting a $10 fee. 
Monthly changes were permitted in January 2001 and the fee was dropped in July 2003. 
Fund 3 members have been permitted to make monthly changes since inception in April 
2001 at no charge. Fund 4 members receive one free investment change per year with 
further changes attracting a $25 fee. For members who joined each fund between 
October 2002 until June 2004 the average number of choices does not appear to indicate 
an impact of fees on choice.  The average number of changes for Fund 4 members who 
were charged a fee beyond the first investment switch, is 1.12 against 1.10 for Fund 3 
and 1.07 for Fund 1 members who paid no fee for any switch. 
 
Performance Measurement  
Returns data for each option offered by the four participating superannuation funds has 
been obtained since the inception of each offering. Fund 1 and Fund 2 credited member 
accounts annually between 1998 and 2001, and 1997 and 1998, respectively before 
adopting monthly crediting. Fund 3 has employed monthly crediting since it first 
offered choice in April 2001. Fund 4 credits member accounts quarterly. For Fund 4 
these quarterly returns between July 1998 and June 2002 have been combined with 
monthly returns data supplied since July 2002. Hence cumulative raw and excess 
returns can be calculated for each member choice since inception but risk adjusted 
measures are problematic due to insufficient returns observations for some choices.  
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Comparable to Yamaguchi, Mitchell, Mottola and Utkus (2006) we estimate the 
monthly raw returns for a member based on their asset allocation(s). We also calculate 
two relative measures. The excess of the member’s return relative, firstly to the default 
option of the fund and secondly relative to each previous choice of the member is 
calculated. This second measure is similar in spirit to the “own relative benchmark” of 
Yamaguchi, et al. (2006). The difference is we calculate the monthly difference using a 
current allocation which is fixed whereas the “current allocation” weightings for 
Yamaguchi, et al. (2006) drift with monthly performance of the underlying asset classes 
reflecting their focus on balances rather than contributions as in this paper. 
 
A return series is generated for each member calculated as 
=
=
N
n
tntnit rwr
1
,,
, where rit is 
the return for member i in period  t, n represents each of the investment options in the 
member’s investment strategy from the N  readymade or asset class options available 
and wn,t is the weighting assigned to option n in period t.  Using this series of raw 
returns a member’s performance can be measured from the time they made their first 
investment strategy change until the end of each fund’s data sample. As noted, the 
observation of rit varies from annual to monthly. Therefore while a raw or excess return 
is able to be calculated from the beginning of each member’s choice, only those choices 
made during the period since monthly returns were published allow risk-adjusted 
measures due to number of observations available. 
 
Performance is measured using raw returns, excess returns, and an information ratio. 
The raw return (rit) is as previously described. The excess is defined as (rit - rbt) where 
rbt is the return on benchmark b in period t. Two benchmarks are used: the default 
option (rdt) for the member’s fund and the member’s previous investment choice rpt. The 
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two excess return measures therefore determine the return of the member’s choice 
relative to remaining in, or changing back, to their fund’s default option, or remaining in 
their previous investment strategy. The raw return and excess return measure are 
annualised as specified in equation 1. 
 1)1 (Return  Annualised
)/12(
1
,,
−





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=
TT
t
N
n
tntn rw   (1) 
where, additionally, T is the investment period in months for the member. 
 
Where monthly returns data is available a risk-adjusted measure, the information ratio, 
is estimated using equation 2. A range of risk adjusted measures are available and 
therefore the choice is contestable. The choice here reflects the ultimate purpose of the 
research which is to help inform members of the consequences of their investment 
strategy choices and provide trustees with information on how their members perform 
given the range of investment strategy choices the trustees make available. When 
measuring investment management performance most studies employ some variation of 
Jensen’s alpha based on single or multi-factor models. Implicit in the use of a multi-
factor alpha is the rationale that returns need adjustment for the returns that could be 
generated from available investable portfolios which capture style, size or other factors 
known to explain returns. Members of the four funds do not have access to these factor 
portfolios and therefore judging their performance relative to this is of questionable 
value. An alternative is the Sharpe Ratio which adjusts performance for risk by 
assuming access to a risk-free asset and calculating the average excess return divided by 
the standard deviation of these excess returns. Member access to a risk-free asset is also 
not available, notwithstanding access to a variety of “Cash” options. A variation is the 
information ratio, or more precisely here the “differential return information ratio" 
 
(Sharpe, 1994), which calculates the excess return using a nominated benchmark, rather 
than the risk-free asset. 
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where re,t is the member’s excess return in month t, defined as the member’s actual 
return in month t (ri,t) less the benchmark option return in month t (rb,t), being either the 
default option (rd,t) or previous investment strategy choice (rp,t). As previously noted, 
fund crediting rates in some cases were originally annual (Fund 1 and Fund 2) or 
quarterly (Fund 4). Information ratios are only calculated when monthly crediting 
commenced. However, information ratios have been calculated for Fund 4 by 
converting the quarterly crediting rate to a monthly rate to supplement the monthly 
return series available since 2002. In this instance the impact on the information ratio is 
to dampen the volatility of excess returns and inflate the IR from what it otherwise 
would be with monthly data. 
 
Performance Assessment 
Member performance is assessed both in terms of overall average member performance 
and across each fund. For purposes of analysis choices have been included where the 
member’s performance period, defined as the time elapsed since first choice was made, 
is at least six-months. In summarising performance data bivariate analysis considers 
differences by fund, the year a decision was made and gender. For Fund 1, Fund 2 and 
Fund 3 who allow members to construct investment choices with asset classes and/or 
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readymades, we assess what types of choices are made by members as well as the 
performance of each choice type. 
 
Multivariate analysis is also employed to further investigate what factors together may 
help explain variation in member performance. Equation three is estimated to explore 
the role of member and investment characteristics. 
 imiP εβα +++= y'c'x  (1) 
where Pi is the performance of member i over all choices the member has made; xm is a 
vector of member characteristics; yc is a vector of investment choice characteristics; and 
εi an error term. Member raw returns differ systematically across the funds given the 
differing strategic asset allocation of each fund’s options and secondly the year a 
member’s choice history began. Given the possible clustering of performance linked to 
both fund membership and the year the first member choice was made, a robust 
covariance matrix was estimated based on “fundyear” clusters. Each fund has a series of 
years where a first decision could be made. For example Fund 3 has four clusters: 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2004. In total there are 21 fundyears (Fund 1 four, Fund 2 seven, Fund 3 
four, Fund 4 six). The robust estimator employed is Rogers’ (1993) application of 
Huber (1967).7 
 
Member Characteristics 
A range of member characteristics were included to explore their relationship with 
member investment choice performance. Gender is included as it has been demonstrated 
to have a relationship with investment decisions in terms of the type of decision and 
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 The requirement that each cluster account for five percent or less of the sample is violated with seven of 
the 21 clusters larger than five percent. Rogers’ (1993) adjustment employed in STATA using hreg2.ado 
has therefore been employed. 
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performance, though the results are not unequivocal.8 Membership length at the time the 
member made their first decision is included to investigate whether familiarity or 
exposure to the investment options available from the fund can explain performance. 
Members with longer membership would have a greater chance of exposure to fund 
publications providing information on the range of choice options available to them and 
investments more generally. Guiso and Japelli (2006) have demonstrated that 
information can be expected to have both a positive and negative relationship with 
performance, depending upon whether a rational or behavioural decision making model 
is assumed, respectively. 
 
Income has been shown to be related to equity allocation (Agnew, Balduzzi and 
Sunden, 2003) and is thus expected to be related to investment performance. Income 
was not observable for members but contributions were available as a proxy. Consistent 
with the finding that equity exposure increases with income, it is hypothesised 
contributions will have a positive relationship with performance. Member age is also 
included as a member characteristic. To the extent that age is positively related with 
investment experience, age may be expected to have a positive effect on performance. 
Confounding this is the potential for cognitive decline with ageing to negatively impact 
on investment skill. Korniotis and Kumar (2007) provide evidence in support of both 
effects using stock holdings though finding the negative effect having a larger impact. 
Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix and Laibson (2007) provide evidence of a humped shape age 
and financial sophistication profile using interest costs and fees paid, with a peak at 
about age 53. Also, confounding possible experience benefits of ageing is the extent to 
which there may be age effects in asset allocation, where members may reduce equity 
                                                 
8
 See for example Barber and Odean (2001) for investment generally and Gerrans and Clark-Murphy 
(2004) for gender differences in an Australian retirement savings context. 
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exposure with age, which may impact raw returns but not risk-adjusted returns. Fund 
membership is controlled for by the inclusion of fund dummies as the investment 
options of each fund differed in level and variability. 
 
Investment Characteristics 
Several characteristics are included which relate to the member’s investment choice 
itself. The number of choices a member has made is included as Odean (1999) and 
Barber and Odean (2000) demonstrate that trading decreases individual performance 
consistent with models of overconfidence using a sample of discount brokerage firm 
clients. Guiso and Japelli (2006) compare rational and behavioural models of 
information gathering, overconfidence and resultant trading and also find a negative 
trading relationship using a sample of Italian investors. They conclude that their results 
do not support a rational decision making model. Yamaguchi et al. (2006) estimate the 
relationship of trading frequency on performance in a retirement savings context using a 
sample of 401(k) participants. They find a positive relationship with trading and raw 
returns but a negative relationship with risk-adjusted returns. 
 
The year a member made their first investment choice is included as a control as over 
the sample period investment option returns varied markedly. For example equity 
markets and international equity in particular experienced poor returns through 2001 
and 2002. The timing of the offering or expansion of choice by a fund at a particular 
time or the date a member joins a fund and makes a decision will impact directly on 
their performance. The length of the investment period is included to control for the fact 
that the dependent variable, whilst annualised, is not estimated over a comparable 
period for all members. In the regression analysis a member was only included if they 
 
had a returns history of six months or more. A member record is treated equally 
therefore if it has a six months or six year history.  
 
The first regression utilises the full choice sample from all four funds and each of the 
member and investment characteristics discussed. A second regression is also estimated 
to explore the relationship between additional investment characteristics and 
performance. The first additional variable is the average number of options chosen in a 
member’s investment choices. It is not clear whether using more or less options in a 
choice is necessarily good or bad. However the number of options made available is 
increasing for most members. The second additional variable, choice type, describes 
how the member constructed their choices. Depending on their fund, members could 
choose pre-mixed readymade options, combine asset classes themselves, or have a 
mixture of readymades and/or asset classes. Fund 4 members were however restricted to 
single readymade choices. Fund 3 members could select a single readymade but not 
multiples, single asset classes or multiple asset classes. Fund 1 and Fund 2 members 
choices expanded from single or multiple readymades, when choice was first offered to 
their members, to a full range of choices. In all, seven investment construction types can 
be identified. In the first two, all choices are either A) one readymade option, or B) one 
asset class. In the next two all member choices involve C) multiple readymades or D) 
multiple asset classes. The remaining are mixtures. In E) all member choices involve 
multiple mixtures of asset classes or readymades but not mixtures of both. In F) at least 
one but not all choice involves mixtures of readymades and asset classes in a single 
choice. Finally in G) all choices are combinations of asset classes and readymades. The 
second regression focuses only on Fund 1 and Fund 2 members. 
 
 	
4. Results 
 
Choice and Overall Performance 
Gallery, Gallery and Brown (2004) found such significant variation in performance of a 
sample of the default options for industry, corporate and government funds that they 
suggested “many Australians’ retirement wealth (or otherwise) will be determined by 
the ‘accident’ of working for a particular employer or in a particular industry” (Gallery, 
Gallery and Brown, 2004, p.60). The results in the current study for all investment 
options available to members of the four funds, summarised in Figure 2, suggest the 
variation goes beyond those who remain in their fund’s default option.  
<Insert Figure 2> 
In terms of how members performed when they could choose from the options available 
to them the most striking result from an examination of the performance data, 
summarised in the last column of Table 2, is that members who exercise choice 
underperform both in terms of raw returns and risk adjusted returns relative to their 
fund’s default option or their own previous investment choice. The overall mean raw 
return is a strong 8.95%. However average excess returns and information ratios are all 
significantly less than zero, both relative to the default option of the member’s fund or 
the member’s previous choice. There is however much additional information behind 
these overall averages.  
<Insert Table 2> 
Firstly, within each fund, gender differences are evident in performance. This is more 
evident for the risk-adjusted measure where males perform better than females. With the 
exception of Fund 3 excess returns are significantly better for males, however Fund 3 is 
the only fund where males have significantly higher raw returns. When data is 
aggregated however, raw returns, excess returns and the information ratio based on the 
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default option are each significantly higher for females than males. This apparent 
contradiction can be explained by the gender splits in each fund. Fund 1 has the largest 
number and proportion of female membership and though their performance is lower 
than Fund 1 males it is better than each other fund’s members. Hence when results are 
aggregated across funds overall female performance becomes better. 
 
Secondly, the year the member makes their first investment decision, summarised in 
Table 3, is an important determinant of member performance by end of the data 
collection period. Those members who made their first choice in 2000 and 2001, who in 
turn had higher equity allocations on average (in 2001 and in international equity in 
particular), have the worst performance in terms of raw returns. Fund 3 members were 
first offered choice in 2001 and the lower average returns of their members, discussed 
below, reflect this timing. Excess returns and information ratios are lowest for 2000 and 
2003. 
<Insert Table 3> 
Table 4 summarises choice type for Fund 1, Fund 2 and Fund 3 members over the 
period where the largest range of options was made available to their members during 
the sample period. Readymade options were the most common choice type used by 
members of all funds. For Fund 1 and Fund 2 members who had a comparable range of 
choice types, more Fund 2 members (34 percent) made all choices involving single 
readymades than Fund 1 members (23 percent) and comparable proportions (31 and 36 
percent respectively) made all choices using combinations of readymades. While Fund 3 
members had a more limited range of options a much larger proportion of members 
relied on a single readymade (79 percent) for all choices. Twice the proportion of Fund 
1 members (26 percent) used combinations of asset classes in all choices than Fund 2 
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
members, whereas approximately double the proportion of Fund 2 members (13 
percent) used single asset class choices than Fund 1 members (seven percent). Fund 3 
members were much less likely to make single asset class choices (three percent). An 
examination of gender suggests that for Fund 2 and Fund 3 members, females were 
more likely to use readymade options whereas males were likely to use multiple asset 
class mixes (Fund 3) or single asset class choices (Fund 2). Little choice type difference 
is evident by gender for Fund 1. The determinants of choice type will be examined in 
future work. 
<Insert Table 4> 
Table 5 presents performance estimates for each choice type by fund and Table 6 ranks 
the performance of each choice for each performance measure. For Fund 1 and Fund 2 
members results are presented for the full data period and the period where full choice 
was available. From the results, choice type matters for a member’s performance. Very 
few choice types performed better on average for members than remaining with their 
fund’s default option or their own previous choice. For the discussion that follows it is 
important to emphasise that “better” means a member underperformed less as on 
average members would have done better to remain in their fund’s default option or 
their previous investment choice. 
<Insert Table 5> 
<Insert Table 6> 
For Fund 2 and Fund 3 the members who performed best, both in raw returns and risk 
adjusted returns, had choices that used combinations of asset classes only. For Fund 2 
the average member raw return for this choice type was almost double the worst 
performing choice type; which was selecting a single readymade. For Fund 3 members 
the disparity between best and worst performing choice type, asset class combinations 
 
versus single asset classes respectively, was 28 percent. Notably those Fund 2 and Fund 
3 members who only made choices using multiple asset class choices, were the only 
choice type group who had average non-negative information ratios. All other choice 
types, which account for the majority of choices, underperformed relative to the fund 
default option or the member’s previous choice. Fund 1 members who similarly only 
used combinations of asset classes, however, performed relatively poorly. The best 
performing Fund 1 members, in terms of raw returns, were those who always combined 
readymades and asset classes in all their choices whereas in risk-adjusted terms those 
who only combined readymades performed the best. Members who relied on one 
readymade in all their choices performed relatively well for Fund 1 and Fund 3 but 
poorly for Fund 2. Staying with single readymade options for all choices was the worst 
performing choice, in terms of raw returns, for Fund 2 members, third worst for Fund 1 
but second best for Fund 3. Relying on selecting single asset classes was the worst 
option for Fund 3 members, second worst for Fund 1 members but third best for Fund 2 
members.  
In summary, member choices do not perform as well as the default.  A general though 
not uniform conclusion is that members who did make changes underperformed least 
when they mixed asset classes or readymade options. It must be emphasised that 
performance has been assessed over short periods relative to the likely average 
investment horizon. Given the average age of members in the sample is 38 years, an 
investment horizon of beyond 25 years needs to be considered. The data only permits 
evaluation of performance over an average twenty seven months. The results therefore 
do not comment on what may ultimately prove the better performing choice over 
member’s eventual total investment period. 
 
 
Performance Variation 
The previous discussion has focussed on average performance with some limited 
analysis of gender, decision year and investment choice type. This section examines 
what characteristics may help explain variation in member performance in a 
multivariate setting. The available data allows a number of member demographics and 
fund/investment characteristics to be empirically investigated for a relationship with 
performance. 
 
As Figure 1 identified, the investment choice options available to members varied over 
the data period. Fund 1 and Fund 2 options increased over the data period whereas Fund 
3 members had the same range of choices and Fund 4 members could only select single 
readymades. As a consequence two estimates of equation 3 are provided with different 
regressors and sample periods. Both regressions are estimated using raw returns and the 
information ratio based on the default as the benchmark. The first regression includes all 
members with at least a six-month performance history, but uses a more limited set of 
variables reflecting that some investment characteristics variables are fixed by which 
fund a member belongs to and the year the decision was made. 
 
Results of the first regression are presented in Table 7. Of member characteristics the 
length of membership before the member made their first choice is significantly 
negatively related to performance. If membership length can be interpreted as being 
related to information, or at least the opportunity to gather information or exposure to 
information, this result is consistent with the findings of Guiso and Jappelli (2006). 
They suggest such a negative relationship between information and performance is 
consistent with a model of overconfidence. The proxy for information used here is 
 
indirect as it is assumes information gathering increases with membership length. This 
is quite different to Guiso and Jappelli (2006) who have direct measures of how much 
time investors devoted to gathering information regarding their investments.  
<Insert Table 7> 
Males perform significantly better in the choices they make. Lower raw returns for 
females may be a reflection of choosing more risk averse options, though lower 
information ratios cannot be similarly explained. This is somewhat at odds with 
previous findings on gender and investment performance (Barber and Odean, 1999) 
particularly given the suggested role of overconfidence in their paper and previously in 
other investment contexts (Guiso and Jappelli, 2006; Barber and Odean, 1999) and 
reported gender differences in feelings of competence in financial matters (Prince, 
1993). 
 
Member contributions levels were also positively related to performance, consistent 
with Barber and Odean (1999) to the extent that contributions are a proxy for income. In 
terms of the investment choice characteristics, the number of choices made and the 
length of the investment period were both significant having controlled for fund 
membership and decision-type, which were also generally significant. The negative 
relationship between number of choices and performance is consistent with the 
literature (Guiso and Jappelli, 2006, Barber and Odean, 1999) though Yamaguchi et al. 
(2006) find a positive trading relationship with trading and raw returns but a negative 
relationship with risk-adjusted returns. The negative sign for investment period suggests 
the longer the member has their investment the lower their performance. 
 
 
In the second regression, summarised in Table 8 two additional variables are included 
using a shorter sample period. This regression includes only Fund 1 and Fund 2 
members as they had the most complete range of choice types available, being able to 
make combinations of readymades and/or asset classes. The sign of each of the previous 
member and investment characteristics are replicated with the additional variables and 
smaller sample. The dummy variables included for how a member constructed their 
investment strategy indicate that choice type is significant. This is an interesting finding 
in view of APRA’s warnings to trustees about allowing “narrow or risky” choices by 
members. Compared with single readymade choices, single asset class choices were 
negatively related to performance but only significantly for risk adjusted performance. 
Only choices which involved multiple readymades were significantly better than 
selections which used only a single readymade option of the fund. The average number 
of options a member used in his or her choices was negatively related to performance 
but only significantly for risk adjusted performance. That is, the fewer options a 
member included in their choices the better their performance. 
<Insert Table 8> 
 
5. Discussion and Further Work 
 
Investment choices, like all choices, have consequences. For workers given the choice 
how to invest their compulsory superannuation contributions, the very real consequence 
of poor choices is smaller accumulated savings when they retire. This sample of 
investment choices from four large not-for-profit funds suggests on average member 
accumulations would be lower than had they stayed with their fund’s default option or 
their previous choice.  A major qualification to this finding is that the performance 
period has been arbitrarily defined by the data sample period. Individual’s choices may 
 
eventually outperform the fund’s default over a longer timeframe. A longer time period 
will allow reflection on this issue. 
 
For fund trustees who have been warned by APRA about allowing “narrow or risky” 
allocations by their members the results for the two funds with the least restrictive array 
of choice options provides some basis for this concern. Choice type does matter within a 
fund but results are not uniform across the funds in this sample. Members whose 
choices could be regarded as the narrowest, as they rely on single asset class options 
performed significantly worse than the readymade options available from their funds. 
However it needs to be made clear how such choices are to be judged as raw returns or 
information ratios provide differing assessments. Finally, the more choices members 
made and the more options they included the worse their performance. Choice may be 
good but too much or too narrow may have detrimental effects. 
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Figure 1 Fund Investment Options 
July              
1995 July                                   1997
July                          
1998
February 
2000
April  
2001
  July             
2001 January 2002 October               2002 July 2003 Final record
Equity
Default
Cash
Ethical
Australian Equity Blend
Overseas Equity Blend December
Australian Shares 2004
International Shares
Fixed Interest 
Property
Cash
Infrastructure
Private equity
Free changes 
Equity
Default
Conservative
Low Risk
Australian Shares
International Shares
Australian Fixed Interest 
International Fixed Interest December
Property 2004
Cash
Ethical International Shares
Ethical Australian Shares
Monthly switching no fees
Growth
Default
Conservative
Cash September
Australian Shares 2004
International Shares Readymade Options
Fixed Interest 
Property Asset classes
Cash
Annual switching no charge Monthly Switching $20 after first switch 
Equity
Default Default
Conservative Conservative
Low Risk Cash
Ethical
Conservative 2
Growth
Fund 2
Fund 3
Fund 4
                  
June    2004
Fund 1
Absolute Returns
Quarterly changes. First change free then $10 per change Monthly changes. First change free then $10 per change
January 
2001
Annual switching no charge Monthly changes $20 fee Free monthly switching 
 
Figure 2 Fund Investment Options Performance 
Returns reflect annualised compounded returns for period commencing at the end of the month until 31/12/2006 
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Fund 3 Readymade Options
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Table 1 Sample Characteristics 
This table summarises the sample data with a breakdown for the full sample and the 
smaller sample utilised in the regression analysis.  
 
 Age 
(years) 
Gender 
(Male 
percent) 
Employer 
Contributions 
($ 2004) 
 
Membership 
Length at 
First Choice 
(months) 
Investment 
Period  
(months) 
Total 
Number 
Choices 
Average 
Options 
 
 Full Sample 
Fund 1 n 37181 37176 32061 37182 43792 43792 43792 
 
Mean 37.36 24 2720.26 19.62 22.43 1.09 2.49 
 
SD 11.74  4390.32 39.16 17.80 0.43 1.65 
Fund 2 n 23021 23018 15891 22436 23030 23030 23030 
 
Mean 36.90 78 4616.08 24.71 29.80 1.17 1.87 
 
SD 11.89  6166.05 44.35 19.99 0.57 1.18 
Fund 3 n 17448 17448 12574 17448 17608 17608 17608 
 
Mean 40.21 41 4291.54 69.30 33.25 1.11 1.45 
 
SD 10.14  4225.91 43.79 10.45 0.56 1.12 
Fund 4 n 35705 35705 24446 35705 35705 35705 35705 
 
Mean 40.12 48 6840.01 33.93 27.47 1.22 1 
 
SD 11.07  8399.73 50.44 20.74 0.58 0 
TOTAL n 113355 113347 84067 112771 120135 120135 120135 
 
Mean 38.57 45 4405.95 32.85 26.93 1.15 1.77 
 
SD 11.43  6229.05 47.71 18.73 0.53 1.35 
 
 Regression Sample 
Fund 1 n 27134 27134 27134 27134 27134 27134 27134 
 
Mean 36.37 23 2395.05 10.41 19.32 1.07 2.66 
 
SD 11.82  4020.96 29.03 8.69 0.36 1.68 
Fund 2 n 13915 13915 13915 13915 13915 13915 13915 
 
Mean 36.67 79 4154.23 25.80 29.69 1.20 1.96 
 
SD 11.77  6120.71 44.91 18.52 0.58 1.22 
Fund 3 n 12071 12701 12071 12071 12071 12071 12071 
 
Mean 39.84 39 4358.60 66.68 33.77 1.12 1.47 
 
SD 10.09  4245.48 43.43 9.42 0.58 1.15 
Fund 4 n 20559 20559 20559 20559 20559 20559 20559 
 
Mean 39.92 50 7872.84 39.63 31.85 1.28 1 
 
SD 10.91  9971.84 51.63 21.70 0.65 0 
TOTAL n 73679 73679 73679 73679 73679 73679 73679 
 
Mean 37.98 44 4577.48 30.69 27.14 1.16 1.88 
 
SD 11.42  6967.95 46.20 16.60 0.54 1.42 
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Table 2 Performance by Fund and Gender  
This table presents mean performance for each fund with a gender breakdown. A significant difference in gender means at a 95 percent confidence level is indicated by bold. 
Performance is measured from end of the first month decision is made to the last record date for choice data from each fund. Only records with at least six months return 
history included. 
  Fund 1 Fund 2 Fund 3 Fund 4 Total 
  Female Male Total Female Male Total Female Male Total Female Male Total Female Male  
Raw Return n 27214 8700 38303 4679 15189 19878 9969 6872 17000 15803 14852 30655 57665 45613 105836 
 mean 11.66 11.75 11.79 9.27 9.22 9.24 4.77 5.05 4.88 7.42 7.51 7.46 9.11 8.52 8.95 
 SD 5.5 5.87 5.67 5.25 5.35 5.33 3.83 4.32 4.04 5.1 5.38 5.24 5.77 5.72 5.81 
Excess (Def) n 27214 8700 38303 4679 15189 19878 9969 6872 17000 15803 14851 30654 57665 45612 105835 
 mean -1.23 -0.99 -1.17 -2.29 -2.07 -2.13 -0.81 -0.81 -0.81 -1.59 -1.29 -1.45 -1.34 -1.42 -1.37 
 SD 3.72 3.92 3.86 3.68 3.53 3.56 1.81 2.09 1.93 3.26 3.11 3.19 3.35 3.34 3.39 
Excess (Prev) n 27214 8700 38303 4679 15189 19878 9969 6872 17000 15803 14852 30655 57665 45613 105836 
 mean -1.17 -0.90 -1.1 -2.08 -1.82 -1.89 -0.82 -0.83 -0.82 -1.36 -1.02 -1.2 -1.24 -1.24 -1.23 
 SD 3.73 3.9 3.87 3.71 3.59 3.62 1.83 2.13 1.96 3.37 3.24 3.32 3.39 3.39 3.44 
IR (Def) n 23580 7538 33506 4568 14839 19415 9969 6872 17000 15803 14851 30654 53920 44100 100575 
 mean -0.12 -0.08 -0.11 -0.27 -0.25 -0.26 -0.09 -0.07 -0.08 -0.11 -0.07 -0.09 -0.12 -0.14 -0.13 
 SD 0.53 0.52 0.54 0.4 0.38 0.39 0.19 0.21 0.2 0.45 0.42 0.44 0.45 0.41 0.44 
IR (Prev) n 23580 7538 33506 4568 14839 19415 9969 6872 17000 15803 14852 30655 53920 44101 100576 
 mean -0.12 -0.07 -0.11 -0.25 -0.23 -0.24 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11 
 SD 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.4 0.39 0.39 0.19 0.21 0.2 0.44 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.41 0.44 
 
Table 3 Performance by Decision Year 
Table present mean performance data broken down by decision year, which is the year the member first made an investment change. Performance is measured from end of the 
first month decision is made to the last record date for choice data from each fund. Only records with at least six months return history included. 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004* Overall 
n 42 129 927 2110 8203 7082 20463 23479 33133 10268 105836 
mean 9.60 9.46 7.52 6.66 5.29 4.25 3.93 7.60 13.00 15.71 8.95 
Raw Return 
SD 0.91 0.55 1.04 1.14 0.96 1.66 2.27 3.72 5.11 6.20 5.81 
n 42 129 927 2110 8203 7082 20463 23478 33133 10268 105835 
mean 0.29 0.22 -0.34 -0.68 -1.03 -1.61 -1.19 -1.30 -1.83 -0.79 -1.37 
Excess (Def) 
SD 0.84 0.51 0.66 0.77 0.70 1.48 1.72 2.49 4.53 5.36 3.39 
n 42 129 927 2110 8203 7082 20463 23479 33133 10268 105836 
mean 0.35 0.25 -0.25 -0.54 -0.95 -1.49 -1.17 -1.09 -1.62 -0.74 -1.23 
Excess (Prev) 
SD 0.86 0.51 0.69 0.90 0.96 1.59 1.78 2.64 4.54 5.38 3.44 
n    1321 7601 4977 19797 23478 33133 10268 100575 
mean    -0.09 -0.12 -0.17 -0.13 -0.12 -0.15 -0.08 
-0.13 
IR (Def) 
SD    0.10 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.23 0.60 0.74 0.44 
n    1321 7601 4977 19797 23479 33133 10268 100575 
mean    -0.05 -0.09 -0.15 -0.13 -0.10 -0.13 -0.07 
-0.11 
IR (Prev) 
SD    0.08 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.24 0.60 0.74 0.44 
* part year observations for all funds 
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Table 4 Choice Type Breakdown 
This table presents a breakdown of choice type during the sample period where each fund offered their 
full range of choices: Fund 1 July 2001-September 2004, Fund 2 January 2002-June 2004, Fund 3 
April 2001- December 2004.  
Gender   
Fund Choice Type Female Male Missing Total 
5550 1766 1615 8931 All Single Readymade 
22.7% 22.6% 24.4% 23.0% 
1593 551 593 2737 All Single Asset Class 
 6.5% 7.0% 9.0% 7.0% 
9130 2754 2123 14007 All Readymade Mixes 
 37.4% 35.2% 32.1% 36.1% 
6586 2196 1398 10180 All Asset Class Mixes 
 27.0% 28.1% 21.1% 26.2% 
262 135 9 406 At Least One Multiple Readymades or 
Multiple Asset Classes - No Mix 1.1% 1.7% 0.1% 1.0% 
126 77 8 211 At Least One Mix Readymades and 
Asset Classes 0.5% 1.0% 0.1% 0.5% 
1160 344 869 2373 All Readymades and Asset Class 
Mixes 4.8% 4.4% 13.1% 6.1% 
24407 7823 6615 38845 
Fund 1 
Total 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
1385 4046 3 5434 All Single Readymade 
37.9% 32.4% 50.0% 33.7% 
224 1924 1 2149 All Single Asset Class 
 6.1% 15.4% 16.7% 13.3% 
1277 3709 1 4987 All Readymade Mixes 
 34.9% 29.7% 16.7% 30.9% 
410 1533 1 1944 All Asset Class Mixes 
 11.2% 12.3% 16.7% 12.0% 
30 145 0 175 At Least One Multiple Readymades or 
Multiple Asset Classes - No Mix 0.8% 1.2% 0.0% 1.1% 
57 168 0 225 At Least One Mix Readymades and 
Asset Classes 1.6% 1.3% 0.0% 1.4% 
276 954 0 1230 All Readymades and Asset Class 
Mixes 7.5% 7.6% 0.0% 7.6% 
3659 12479 6 16144 
Fund 2 
Total 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
8520 5242 118 13880 All Single Readymade 
82.5% 73.6% 73.8% 78.8% 
241 257 8 506 All Single Asset Class 
2.3% 3.6% 5.0% 2.9% 
1371 1447 29 2847 At Least One Multiple Asset Class Mix 
13.3% 20.3% 18.1% 16.2% 
190 180 5 375 All Asset Class Mixes 
1.8% 2.5% 3.1% 2.1% 
10322 7126 160 17608 
Fund 3 
Total 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 5 Performance by Choice Type and Fund (all records, six months history) 
Table presents performance summary for choice types being: A) all choices one readymade, B) all choices one 
asset class, C) all choices consist of readymades at least one multiple D) all choices consist of asset classes at 
least some more than one, E) at least one choice has multiple readymades and/or multiple asset classes but not 
mixtures, F) at least one mixture of asset classes and readymades in a single choice, G) all choices mixtures of 
asset classes and readymades. Performance is from end of the first month decision is made to the last record 
date for choice data from each fund. Only records with at least six months return history included. 
   
A B C D E F G Total 
Fund 1 Raw Return n 10503 2331 13902 9203 655 251 1458 38303 
overall  mean 11.11 8.80 12.79 11.74 7.80 10.06 14.43 11.79 
  SD 6.83 6.77 5.01 4.18 4.73 5.66 5.22 5.66 
 Excess (Def) n 10503 2331 13902 9203 655 251 1458 38303 
  mean -0.82 -4.80 -0.13 -2.12 -2.70 -1.85 -0.94 -1.17 
  SD 4.61 5.93 2.35 3.32 2.74 3.13 4.08 3.86 
 Excess n 10503 2331 13902 9203 655 251 1458 38303 
  mean -0.78 -4.68 -0.11 -2.06 -1.69 -1.28 -0.92 -1.10 
  SD 4.62 6.03 2.34 3.32 3.19 2.99 4.08 3.87 
 IR (Def) n 7600 2283 12384 9203 392 186 1458 33506 
  mean -0.07 -0.41 0.02 -0.23 -0.26 -0.18 -0.18 -0.11 
  SD 0.56 0.58 0.50 0.46 0.33 0.46 0.72 0.54 
 IR (Prev) n 7600 2283 12384 9203 392 186 1458 33506 
  mean -0.07 -0.40 0.02 -0.22 -0.13 -0.10 -0.18 -0.11 
  SD 0.56 0.59 0.50 0.46 0.33 0.45 0.72 0.54 
Fund 1 Raw Return n 7518 2282 12322 9203 387 186 1458 33356 
7/01-12/04  mean 13.06 8.88 13.70 11.74 9.87 11.88 14.43 12.66 
  SD 7.01 6.81 4.54 4.18 4.74 5.30 5.22 5.49 
 Excess (Def) n 7518 2282 12322 9203 387 186 1458 33356 
  mean -0.60 -4.85 0.06 -2.12 -2.76 -1.63 -0.94 -1.11 
  SD 5.26 5.97 2.38 3.32 3.07 3.38 4.08 4.07 
 Excess n 7518 2282 12322 9203 387 186 1458 33356 
  mean -0.58 -4.74 0.06 -2.06 -1.42 -0.93 -0.92 -1.06 
  SD 5.28 6.06 2.38 3.32 3.67 3.15 4.08 4.07 
 IR (Def) n 7518 2282 12322 9203 387 186 1458 33356 
  mean -0.07 -0.41 0.02 -0.23 -0.26 -0.18 -0.18 -0.11 
  SD 0.56 0.58 0.50 0.46 0.33 0.46 0.72 0.54 
 IR (Prev) n 7518 2282 12322 9203 387 186 1458 33356 
  mean -0.07 -0.40 0.02 -0.22 -0.12 -0.10 -0.18 -0.11 
  SD 0.56 0.59 0.50 0.46 0.33 0.45 0.72 .54 
Fund 2 Raw Return n 7831 742 7963 1651 297 369 1025 19878 
  mean 7.55 13.41 8.70 15.07 8.54 9.17 14.12 9.24 
  SD 4.68 9.55 3.94 5.27 4.36 4.71 4.84 5.33 
 Excess (Def) n 7831 742 7963 1651 297 369 1025 19878 
  mean -3.30 -1.16 -1.64 -0.07 -2.19 -1.67 -1.11 -2.12 
  SD 3.83 7.89 1.83 3.91 2.49 2.55 3.70 3.56 
 Excess n 7831 742 7963 1651 297 369 1025 19878 
  mean -2.98 -0.78 -1.51 -0.01 -0.69 -0.52 -1.07 -1.88 
  SD 3.99 7.99 1.81 3.89 3.10 2.63 3.68 3.62 
 IR (Def) n 7577 731 7798 1651 281 352 1025 19415 
  mean -0.28 -0.09 -0.34 0.00 -0.21 -0.18 -0.12 -0.26 
  SD 0.34 0.62 0.34 0.40 0.23 0.30 0.52 0 .38 
 IR (Prev) n 7577 731 7798 1651 281 352 1025 19415 
  mean -0.25 -0.06 -0.32 0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.11 -0.24 
  SD 0.35 0.63 0.35 0.40 0.25 0.27 0.52 0 .39 
Fund 2 Raw Return n 5445 692 5354 1651 180 227 1025 5445 
01/02-12/04  mean 8.71 13.99 10.23 15.07 10.92 11.59 14.12 8.71 
  SD 5.15 9.62 3.94 5.27 3.93 4.43 4.84 5.15 
 Excess (Def) n 5445 692 5354 1651 180 227 1025 5445 
  mean -4.04 -1.17 -1.94 -0.07 -2.51 -1.88 -1.11 -4.04 
  SD 4.36 8.16 2.11 3.91 2.98 3.11 3.70 4.36 
 Excess n 5445 692 5354 1651 180 227 1025 5445 
  mean -3.62 -0.80 -1.81 -0.01 -0.30 -0.32 -1.07 -3.62 
  SD 4.60 8.25 2.09 3.89 3.69 3.15 3.68 4.60 
 IR (Def) n 5445 692 5354 1651 180 227 1025 5445 
  mean -0.32 -0.09 -0.40 0.00 -0.23 -0.20 -0.12 -0.32 
  SD 0.39 0.64 0.39 0.40 0.26 0.37 0.52 0.39 
 IR (Prev) n 5445 692 5354 1651 180 227 1025 5445 
  mean -0.27 -0.06 -0.38 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.11 -0.27 
 
  SD 0.40 0.65 0.40 0.40 0.28 0.32 0.52 0.40 
           
Fund 3 Raw Return n 13392 490  2748 370   17000 
4/01-9/04  mean 4.69 4.22  6.02 4.26   4.88 
  SD 3.27 9.01  5.52 3.89   4.04 
 Excess (Def) n 13392 490  2748 370   17000 
  mean -0.86 -2.16  -0.26 -1.31   -0.81 
  SD 1.11 6.22  2.96 2.46   1.93 
 Excess n 13392 490  2748 370   17000 
  mean -0.85 -2.25  -0.36 -1.52   -0.82 
  SD 1.14 6.17  2.97 2.96   1.96 
 IR (Def) n 13392 490  2748 370   17000 
  mean -0.10 -0.06  0.04 -0.11   -0.08 
  SD 0.16 0.29  0.27 0.20   0.20 
 IR (Prev) n 13392 490  2748 370   17000 
  mean -0.10 -0.07  0.03 -0.11   -0.08 
  SD 0.16 0.28  0.27 0.20   0.20 
Fund 4 Raw Return n 30655       30655 
7/98-6/04  mean 7.46       7.46 
  SD 5.24       5.24 
 Excess (Def) n 30654       30654 
  mean -1.45       -1.45 
  SD 3.19       3.19 
 Excess n 30655       30655 
  mean -1.20       -1.20 
  SD 3.32       3.32 
 IR (Def) n 30654       30654 
  mean -0.09       -0.09 
  SD 0.44       0.44 
 IR (Prev) n 30655       30655 
  mean -0.06       -0.06 
  SD 0.43       0.43 
 
 
 
Table 6 Performance by Choice Type (all records, minimum 6 month returns) 
Table presents performance rank from best (1) to worst (7) for choice types being: A) all choices one 
readymade, B) all choices one asset class, C) all choices consist of readymades at least one multiple D) all 
choices consist of asset classes at least some more than one, E) at least one choice has multiple readymades 
and/or multiple asset classes but not mixtures, F) at least one mixture of asset classes and readymades in a 
single choice, G) all choices mixtures of asset classes and readymades. Performance is from end of the first 
month decision is made to the last record date for choice data from each fund. Only records with at least six 
months return history included. Fund 4 is not included as during the period of analysis members were only 
able to select single readymade options. Minimum six 6 month performance history. 
  Choice Type 
  A B C D E F G 
Fund 1 Raw Return 4 6 2 3 7 5 1 
 Overall Excess (Def) 2 7 1 5 6 4 3 
  Excess (Prev) 2 7 1 6 5 4 3 
  IR (Def) 2 7 1 5 6 3 4 
  IR (Prev) 2 7 1 6 4 3 5 
Fund 1 Raw Return 3 7 2 5 6 4 1 
7/01-12/04 Excess (Def) 2 7 1 5 6 4 3 
 Excess (Prev) 2 7 1 6 5 4 3 
 IR (Def) 2 7 1 5 6 4 3 
 IR (Prev) 2 7 1 5 6 4 3 
Fund 2 Raw Return 7 3 5 1 6 4 2 
 Overall Excess (Def) 7 3 4 1 6 5 2 
  Excess (Prev) 7 4 6 1 3 2 5 
  IR (Def) 6 2 7 1 5 4 3 
  IR (Prev) 6 3 7 1 4 2 5 
Fund 2 Raw Return 7 3 6 1 5 4 2 
01/02-12/04 Excess (Def) 7 3 6 1 5 4 2 
 Excess (Prev) 7 4 6 1 2 3 5 
 IR (Def) 6 2 7 1 5 4 3 
 IR (Prev) 6 4 7 1 2 3 5 
Fund 3 Raw Return 2 4  1 3   
 Overall Excess (Def) 2 4  1 3   
  Excess (Prev) 2 4  1 3   
  IR (Def) 3 2  1 4   
  IR (Prev) 3 2  1 4   
 
 
Table 7 Performance Regressions – Full Sample 
This table presents the regression results for all member records for all funds with a 
minimum six month performance history.  
 Performance Measure 
 Raw 
Returns Std Error 
Information 
Ratio Std Error 
Member characteristics 
    
Membership 
-0.0036** 0.0014 -0.0006*** 0.0002 
Age 
-0.0139 0.0095 -0.0012 0.0010 
Gender 0.2592* 0.1321 0.0346** 0.0158 
Contributions (Ln) 0.1590** 0.0713 0.0232*** 0.0073 
Fund (base Fund 4)     
Fund 1 2.2019*** 0.2858 0.0319* 0.0167 
Fund 2 1.0489** 0.4390 -0.1213*** 0.0297 
Fund 3 0.0817 0.4394 0.1246** 0.0458 
Investment Characteristics 
    
Investment length (months) 
-0.1082*** 0.0109 -0.0134*** 0.0050 
Total Choices 
-0.1734** 0.0841 -0.0307*** 0.0129 
Decision year (base 2004) 
    
1998 
-1.2506* 0.7307 0.8302*** 0.3095 
1999 
-3.4174*** 0.6420 0.6646*** 0.2599 
2000 
-6.3305*** 0.5806 0.4977** 0.2097 
2001 
-7.3245*** 0.4838 0.2717* 0.1489 
2002 
-4.6282*** 0.3045 0.1891* 0.0934 
2003 
-1.3310*** 0.2207 0.0269 0.0576 
Intercept 14.4839*** 0.3432 -0.0455 0.0629 
n 77776  73679  
Adjusted R2 0.5537  0.0405  
***99% **95% *90% significance levels 
 
 	
Table 8 Performance Regressions – Restricted Sample 
This table presents the regression results for all members of Fund 1 and Fund 2 only 
with a minimum six month performance history.  
 Performance Measure 
 
Raw 
Returns Std Error 
Information 
Ratio 
Std 
Error 
Member characteristics     
Membership -0.0069** 0.0028 -0.0005* 0.0003 
Age -0.0039 0.0128 0.0000 0.0012 
Gender 0.3127** 0.1322 0.0349** 0.0143 
Contributions (Ln) 0.1822*** 0.0573 0.0292*** 0.0076 
Fund 1 (base Fund 2) 1.4905*** 0.2709 0.2203*** 0.0245 
Investment Characteristics     
Investment length (months) -0.2707** 0.1090 -0.0121*** 0.0031 
Total Choices -0.0270 0.0804 -0.0216** 0.0101 
Average Number Options -0.0915 0.0840 -0.0357*** 0.0109 
Choice type (All readymade base)     
Single asset class -2.5118 1.6309 -0.1974* 0.1120 
Multiple readymades 1.5813*** 0.3941 0.1239*** 0.0349 
Multiple asset classes 0.0772 1.3126 0.0233 0.0942 
Separate readymades/asset class mix -0.4686 0.9410 -0.0184 0.0663 
Mix of readymades & asset classes 0.8945 1.1440 0.0977 0.0819 
All mix readymades & asset classes 0.9866 1.1021 0.0967 0.0998 
Decision year (base 2004)     
2001 -2.0215 3.3430 0.2124** 0.0866 
2002 -1.2816 2.2284 0.1765*** 0.0560 
2003 -0.1238 0.8543 -0.0106 0.0392 
Intercept 15.7078*** 1.0247 -0.2794*** 0.0494 
n 36661  36661  
Adjusted R2 0.2980  0.0600  
***99% **95% *90% significance levels 
 
 
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